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Optimal distortionary taxation is known to display dynamic inconsistency
in the sence that an optimal announced tax rate policy gives incentives
to renege and, therefore, is not credible in the view of rational con-
sumers, whereas the consistent policy leads to lower social welfare.
This paper extends the analysis to contingent tax rate policies, where
the government uses information not only on the initial capital endow-
ments but also on the current capital stocks. There are contingent tax
rate policies with commitments which yield the first-best result and
are, therefore, time-consistent. The credible contingent tax rate policy
withcut ccW,~,it~re~iLs may generate more social welfare than the standard
optimal tax rate policy and is always better than the consistent tax
rate policy with restricted information. In the case of more than one
consumer the first-best result can not be achieved anymore. For a
growing number of consumers the credible tax rate policy with full
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S-nce Kydland and Prescott (1977) have confronted the economi.cs profes-
~;n with the problem of dynamic inconsistency or time-i.nconsistency of
optimal policies, several authors have treated the problem in a morc
speciiic context. The same type of problem occurs for utility maximizers
saith preferences changing over time and as such the problem goes back t.o
~~trotz (1956). The dynamic inconsistency of optimal distortionary taxa-
tion has been given considerable attention by Kydland and Prescott
(?980), Fischer (1980) and Rogers (1986, 1987). Fischer (1980) uses a
stripped-down version of the problem studied by Kydland and Prescott
(1980). In this version there are only two periods and one ca~sumer. The
consumer takes a savings~consumption decision in the first period and a
labourlconsumption decision in the second period. The government has to
resort to distortionary taxation of both labour and capital income in
the second period. Fisctier shows that the optimal tax rate policy for
the two-period problem is time-inconsistent. That is to say, there is an
incentive for the government to renege on the announced policy after the
consumer has made the savings~consumption decision in the first period.
The reas~n is that the announcement of taxation of both labour ar.d
capitai income induces a favourable savings decision, whereas in the
second period it. is optimal to only tax capital income. The real problem
ncw is that, in the absence of the possibility to externally constrain
ttie behaviour of t}re government, the announced tax rate policy is not
credible and theref'ore will not be expected by a rational consumer. A
req~iirsment of consistency leads to a policy which is credible, that is,
which will be believed by a rational consumer. However, such a policy
yields lower social welfare. This phenomenon occurs, as Fischer (1980)
~hows, even if the government maximizes the utility of the (represen-
tative) consumer. Rogers (1986) investigates the effects of distributive
goals for the model with N consumers. Rogers (1987) extends the model
with expenditure taxes and studies the implications.
Ttre issue that seems somewhat overlooked is the role of information. The
time-inconsístent optimal tax policy is an "open-loop" policy which only
relies on information on the initial capital endowment. Fischer's (1980)
consistent tax policy is in fact also an open-loop policy since the- ~-
annonnced t.ax rates are also only a function of the initial capi;al
endowment. It mercly has the flavour of a"feedback" policy tiinc~e
reneging on the announced tax rates presupposes knowledge about. the
capital stock at the beginning of period two.
I'his paper ínvestigates the impact oF information starting from the
simple model used by Fischer (1980). .It can also be said that this paper
extends the analysis from rules to contingent rules. 7t is shown that if
the tax rates may be a function of the capital stock in period one aiid
period two, which will be denoted by "closed-loop" information, it is
possible to construct tax rate policies which yield the command optimum.
Since the command optimum is reached, these tax rate policies are time-
consistent. However, another type of dynamic suboptimality occurs. These
policies are onl,y time-consistent on the equilibrium path and not off
the equilibrium path, where the equilibrium path is defined as the
resulting time path for the capital stock in a behavioural equilibrium
between government and consumer. This implies that these policies are
not robust against unexpected deviations from the equilibrium path and
in that sense they are not credible. A requirement that they are will be
called the requirement of strong time-consistency. This resembles the
requirement of "subgame perfectness" in an extensive form Nash game (see
Selten, i9~5). The tax rate policy which is also time-consistent off the
equilibrium path will be called the "feedback" policy, because it has
the property that it only depends upon information on the current
capital stock. It is clear that the requirement of subgame perfectness
leads to lower social welfare. It is not immediately clear, however, how
this feedback policy compares with the time-consistent and time-
inconsistenL open-loop policies. The time-inconsistent open-loop policy
can be better or worse in terms of social welfare than the feedback
policy. However, it is shown that the social welfare resulting from the
feedback tax rate policy is higher than the social welfare resulting
from the consistent operi-loop tax rate policy. It pays to gather infor-
mation on the capital stock in period two both in terms of robustness
against unexpected events and in terms of social welfare. Furthermore,
the feedback tax rate policy exists for a wider range of model parameter
values. The same results are found for the model with N identical con-
sumers. When the number of consumers goes to infinity, the social-~-
welfare gain of the feedback policy over the consistent open-loop policy
goes to zero. When the consumers are not identical, that is when they
hsve different initial capital endowments, the closed-loop policy yieLds
the highest social welfare, but not the command optimum.
I'o summarize, this paper investigates the role oF information in a
d~namic optimal taxati.on model. In the case of identical consumers the
government e:arr reach the commrrnd optimum bv using a cont.ingent tax rfitc~
policy. When the government can not be committed to stick to an an-
nounced t,ax rate policy and when rational consumers realize this, a tax
policy should be credible. For open-loop or resY,ricted information
policies credibility means time-consistency. T'his credible tax rate
policy is derived by Fischer (1980) and further exploited by Rogers
()986, 1~87). For closed-loop or full information policies credibility
means strong time-consistency or subgame perfectness. This credible tax
rate policy is derived in this paper and the results are compared with
the earlier results.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the
Fischer analysis and discusses briefly what happens when the consumer
realizes the government's budget constraint. Section 3 extends the
analysis to closed-loop information and section 4 to N consumers.
Section 5 contai nc come n,Y..~. ~~al c;:a,;,ples anu seui,ion ó the conclusions
and suggestions for further research.2. The Fischer analysis
Fischer (1980) considers a two-period taxation problem with only one
(representative) consumer. The government taxes the consumer in the
second period and spends these taxes on public goods gz. The consumer
}ias an initial capital endowment k()0), consumes c in the first
1 1
period, consumes cz in the second period and works nz out of available
time n ín the second period. The production function is linear witti
marginal productivity of labour equal to a(~0) and marginal productivity
of capital equsl to b()0). This implies that the initial capital
endowment kt yields Rkl, with R-1tb, and that the capital stock in the
second period k with labour n yields Rk tan . The government is sup- z z 2 z
posed to maximize the utility of the consumer, which is given by
U(ct,cz,nz,gz) - lncltb{lncz;aln(n-nz)tSingz} (1)
with a,~ and b)0.
The technological constraints are
c fk - Rk
i z i
c 'g - Rk tan
z 2 ~ z
(2)
(3)
It is furthermore required that cl,cz,gz,(n-nz)~0 and nz,kza0.













g~ - i~c2 ( 7 )-5-
aild this solution will be called the







and n- are positive, which implies that the maximization problem has an
inteiior solution. Throughout the paper it is assumed that if solutions
exist these are interior solutions.
It is clear that the government can reach the command optimum with lumn-
sum taxation. When the government levies










It is easy to show that when the government levies taxes Tz-g2 the
optimal reaction of the consumer is (ct,cz,nz), so that the commarrd
optimum z~esults. There is also no dynamic inconsistency. When the
government anrrounces taxation T- the optimal first-period consumption z'
is c~ with resulting capital stock k-. Furthermore, the second-period r z











i ba so that the
taxes T the optímal reacticm z'
(12)
(13)
It follows that the second-period optimal taxation is-h-
~(Rk }ari)
Because T- and k. fit equation ( 14;, T. is still the optimal lump-sam ~ - z
taxation after first-period consumption c- led to second-period capital i
stock k~, so that dynamic iriconsistency does not occur. This is of
course not surprising, since the command optimum is the best possible
result ( see also Hillier and Malcomson, 1984), but to spell out the
reasocling with equations ( 12)-(14) might become useful in the sequel.
Fischer ( 1980) shows that dynamic inconsistency arises when the govern-
ment has to resort to distortionary taxes t on capital income and t on
k n
labour income. The intuition is clear. It is good to have savings in the
first period and to tax only capital income in the second period. In
order to induce savings the tax rate on capital income should be
relatively low. In the optimum a positive tax rate on labour income
results, which becomes suboptimal in the second period. It is important
to note that this phenomenon only occurs when the consumer does not take
into account that the taxes t Rk }t an result in government spending k 2 n 2
gZ. Otherwise, any pair of tax rates (tk,tn) satisfying g- -
tkRk2}tnaI7z yields the consumers reaction (c1,c2,nZ), so that again the
command optimum is achiéved aiid àynamic inconsistency disappears. For
example, tk - tn - 1}~ has the desired eFFect. The Fischer analysis
relies on the assumption that the consumer treats government spending as
exogenous.
With tax rates t and t the second-period budget constraint (3) becomes
k n
c2 - (1-tk)RkZ}(1-tn)an2
The optimal reaction of the consumer to these tax rates is
(1-t )R~k }(1-t )an
k 1 n
ct - {1}b(1}~)}(1-t )R
k
(3')
c2 - b(1-tk)Rc~ (16)ac
n - n -
z (1-t )a (lj)
The pair of tax rates (t t) that maximizes utility (1), given the k ' n
technological constraint (2), the behavourial constraints (15)-(1~) and
the government's budget constraint gL-tkRkZttnanz is given as the
soluti.on to the set of equations
t baRzk t an
n I k
(1-t )z - (1-t
n k
c Q
{b(lts) t lbt . llt }{(1-tk)Rzklt(1-tn)an}
n k
- {l.tb(lta)}{RZkttan} - 0 (19)
The most strikiiig aspect of this result is that t~ 0, because this
n
implíes that the optimal pair of tax rates is a time-inconsistent tax
policy. In the second period, where kz is given, the opti-mal reaction of











The pair of tax rates (t ,t ) that maximizes the second-period part of
k n
utility (1), given the capital stock k and the behavioural constraints z








.Although they are optimal for the two-period problem, the tax rates that
satisFy (18) and (19) are not credíble and will not be expected by a-r-
rational consumer. In a rational expectations equilibrium equatiuns
(22)-(23) have to hold. Eischer (1980) requires consístency of equatic~ns
(22). (23). (15) ~ind (2) and in this way a consistent tax rate t is N
found as the solution to the quadratic equationl
b(1ta.,8)R`k (1-tk)~-{b(lta)R`ki~(1-b~)a1}(1-tk)tan - 0 ( ~'41
One of' the two solutions of (24) typically yields higher social wel.fare
tfian the other (see appendix). Also, and more importantly, in order to
guarantee at least one real solution, the values of the modeT parameters
have to be restricted. Of course, because consistency is an additior~,al
restriction, the utility of the consistent tax rate policy is lower thar~
the utility of the optimal tax rate policy.
Fischer (1980) also considers the "inconsistent" solution which resul.ts
from cheating on {18)-(19) by (22)-(23) under the assumption that the
consumer believed the government and consumed c according to (15), (18) i
and (1~). Rogers (1986) investigates for the model with N consumers how
the government's distributive goals restrict the problem of time-
inconsistency. Rogers (198~) shows that the welfare rankings of
a7( anlji ti~ra an`i inrnmo Yo.;3t1Cn ... ..Ct bC .,~ d undi,. u i i P--- ay prc~ vc 2q;: rement
of time-consistency. This paper will focus mainly on the effects of
contingent tax rate policies for the basic model and for the same type
of model with N consumers.
1) It is assumed that k2~0, which would otherwise lead to a third but
uninterestir,g consistent solution.-9-
3. Contingent tax rate policies
Ln section 2 the t.ax policies are a function of time and ini.tia] capit:~l
endowment. Considering that in this very simple economy the state of the
economy is the capital stock, it can also be said that the tax policies
are a function of time and initial state. In difference game terminolegy
there is an open-loop information pattern (Basar and Olsder, 1982). The
game is of the von Stackelberg type with the government as leader and
the consumer as follower. In this terminology the solut:ion
(tk,t ,ct,cz,n ) of the set of equations (15)-(19) is the open-loap
Stackelberg solution of the difference game. Simaan and Cruz (1973a.
i973b) alread,y detected the dynamic inconsistency of this decision
model. The consistent tax rate po]icy from section 2 with the rational
reaction of the consumer may be called the consistent open-loop
Stackelberg solution (Meijdam and de Zeeuw, 1986). This section extends
the analysis to tax rate policies that may also be a function of the
current state of the economy or the current capital stock: contingent
tax rate policies. In difference game terminology a closed-loop infor-
mation pattern is considered.
The first step that springs to mind is to reconsider equations (22)-
(1jj as functional relationships instead of algebraic relationships. The
tax rates t aiid t are given as a function of the capital stock k.
k n ,
This tax rate policy will, by construction, not suffer from dynamic
inconsistency. However, there is more. When the tax rules (22) and (23)
are substituted into the consumer's reactions (20) and (21) the optimal







n - n - - z a (26)
Equations (22), (23), (2j) and (26) form the solution to the optimal
taxation problem for the second period given any "initial" capital
endownent k. It is said that these equations form the behavioural-10-
equilir,rium of the "subgame" of the second period. On the analogy of' a
concept in the theory of extensive form Nash games (Selten, 19~5) a
"subgame perfect" equilibrium will be a solution to the optimal dynamic
taxation problem where the behaviour in the second period is given hy
(22), (23), (~5) and (26). Simaan and Cruz (19~3a, 19~3b) call this a
feedback Stackelberg solution and identify it with the i.dea of dynamic
programming. It remains to identify the optimal first period consumption
c. Straightforward calculations show that
i
R2k fan i
ci - {1{b(1}a)}R (27)
The requirement of subgame perfectness is stronger than the requíremenC
of time-consistency. Time-consistency requires that (22)-(23) hold for
the resulting capital stock k2. Subgame perfectness requires that (22)-
(23) hold for ~ capital stock kz. It is also said that subgame perfect
policies are not only time-consistent on the equilibrium path but also
off the equilibrium path. It means that these tax rate policies are
robust against unexpected events that change the capital stock k and in
z
this way they satisfy the strongest idea of credibility. Both the
~VVCLrllTlent alld Í.,ÍG iekJl'eJelttatlVC ~.VnJ111T1C1' mkikC 11V t;ivtLLUliLwCliLs lUf' LnC
second period. Although the feedback solution is strongly time-
consistent, it yields higher utility than the consistent open-loop
solut.ion. This is possible because in the feedback solution t.he
government is not restricted to use tax rate policies that are a
function of time and initial capital endowment only. The proof of this
important result is given ir. the appendix.
The question arises whether there are contingent tax rate policies with
commitments and possibly memory information, that yield a better result
in terms of utility than this subgame perfect policy. The answer is yes.
There are several contingent tax rate policies that even yield tl~e
command optimum. This can be seen as follows. These tax rate policies
(tK(k,),t~(kZ)) have to induce the consumer to choose (cl,c2,nz) and
have to raise total taxation gz. The behaviour of the consumer facing
these tax rate policies is given by-11-
{1-tk(k1)}R`k ~{1-t~(k`)}an




n - n - 2
z {1-tn (k2 ) }a (30)
where tk(k2) and t~(kz) are the first derivatives of tk(kZ) and tn(k`)
with respect to kG, respectively. Comparing this with the command op-
timum it follows that (t (k ),t (k )) have to satisfy
k 2 n 2
tk(kZ)Rttk(kZ)Rkzttn(k2)an2 - 0
gz
tk (k2 ) -
Rk~
z




There are several solutions to (31)-(33). Two examples are the
"reciprocal" tax rule
g, b~3(Rzkl tan)
tk (k2 ) - Rk - {lfb(ltat)e)}Rk
z ~
t (k2) - 0
and the linear tax rule
-g 2g
t (k,) - 2 k t ?




t,(ki) - o (37)-12-
The reciprocal tax rule is in !'act disguised lump-sum taxation. TC s-,vs
that the government will only tax capital income but always to the
amount g`, whatever the consumer's saving decision in the first peri-od
has been. The more the consumer has saved the lower will be the Lax
rate. As can be seen in equation (34) this tax policy is in fac.t a
f'unction of both the current state k and the initial state k. In 1 1
difference game terminology i.t is said that there is a closed-loop
memory information pattern (Bagar and Olsder, 1982). It is well knowr~
that this information pattern can give very good results for the leader,
and thus in this case also for the follower.
The tax rate policy (34)-(35) induces first-peri.od consumption c- so
i
that capital stock k- results. After substitution of expression (8) for z





`` b(lta.s)Rzk -an i
It is easy to show that this expression equals the right-hand side of
equation (22) for kz given by the right-hand side of equation (8). This
implies , together with t-0. r.hat r.hP raX rarP nnl ; r., ~ ZCL ~- ~~G ~;,. f; ..,,.- ~ . -.-. ---- r --..d ~r~r ~JII ~.~ ~aua~.
consistent, which is again not surprising since the command optimum is
achieved. However, the tax rate policy t34)-(37) is not subgame perfect.
For any k ~e k- it becomes suboptimal. This means that the tax rate z .
policy (34)-(35) is time-consistent on the equilibrium path but not off
the equilibrium path.
It is clear that the requirement oF strong time-consistency or subgame
perfectness leads to a loss of social welfare. It is not immediately
clear, however, how the social welfare resulting From this policy
relates to the social welfare that r~sults from the time-inconsistent
and the time-consistent policies of Fischer (1980). In difference game
terminology, it is not clear how the outcomes of the open-loop, consis-
tent open-loop, closed-loop memory and feedback Stackelberg solutions
relate. The closed-loop memory equilibrium is the best and leads to the
command optimum. This implies that there is a consistent contingent tax-i 3-
rate policy which yields the best oossíble result. The consistent open-
loop equilibrium is worse than the open-loop one. The feedback
equilibrium can be better as well as worse than the open-loop
equilibrium (see section 5). It can be proven, however, that the feed-
back ~~~uil.-brium is always better than the consistent open-loop
equilibrium (see appendix). This implies that there is a strongl,y time-
consístent contingent tax rate policy with a óetter performance than the
time-consistent tax rate policy introduced by Fischer (1980). It pays to
gather information on the capital stock ín the second period and to
choose the contingent tax rate policy (22)-(23) both in terms of
robustness against unexpected events and in terms of social welfare. The
social welfare is often even higher than for the time-inconsistent open-
loop tax rate policy.
The next section will analyse the problem for the somewhat more realis-
tic case of N consumers.-14-
4. N consumers
This section extends sections 2 and 3 to the case where there are N
consi~mers with identical utility functions of the type (1) and identical
labour UroducCivity, but with different initial capital endowments k~,
í-1,...,N. Social welfare, the objective of the government, is assumed
to be the sum of the índividual utilities
~i-1[lncitb{lncztaln(n-n2)t~ingz}]
The technological constraints are
E" c`.k - R~N k' .,i i z t-i i
v
E c~tg - Rk taF" n' 1-i z z z i-i z
where k-F~ k`. The command optimum is given by z ~-i z
R~k ~an
~' i
ci - ci - {ltá(ltoc.,g)}R






~ - ~ - ~cz
n2 - n2 - n - a (i-1,...,N) (41~)
~N
gz ' Í3 1-1C - pNc2 (45)
where k- lF~' k'. In the command optimum all the consumers work and i N ;-i i
consume the same. It is as if they all employ the average initial
capital endowment k .
i
What can the government achieve with lump-sum taxation? That depends. If
the government can tax each consumer with a different amount the command
optimum can be induced. Each consumer reacts to lump-sum taxation accor-
ding to equations (9)-(11). It follows, tnat the optimal lump-sum taxes
are~ {ltb(lt~)}R`ki-ó~?an
T - R`k - {itb(1~afG)} (i-1,....N) (~16)
This tax policy has a strong distributive effect. The higher the iniT.ial
capital s,:o k the more tax will be levied and for low initial capital
endowmenY,s the tax may become negative or, to put it differently, may
become a subsidy. Each ~onsumer enàs up with the same utility regardless
of the initial. capital endowment.
If the government can only tax each consumer with the same amount the
command optimum can not be induced (unless of course each consumer has
the same capital endowment). In this case the optimal lump-sum tax per
consumer is the solution T~ of the equation a
i-1 R`k'fan-T T
~ ~ 2
which leads to sec.ond-period capítal stocks
b(lta)RZk~-antT-
í' ~
kz - {ltb(lta)}R ~ (48)
Thig rw p~l i~ y .i;,ea . ~r ho.,e ~~rh " gtrCnb diStri;,`;St:.Ve eFFe~r . The
higher the initial capital endowment the more utility will result. It is
important to note that both lump-sum taxation policies require infor-
mation on the whole set: of initial capital endowments or, to piit it
differently, on the initial state of the economy. Furthermore, both
lump-sum taxPS are time-consistent. For policy (46) this is again not
surprising, since it leads to the command optimum. For policy (4~) some
analysis is needed. In the second period each consumer reacts to lump-
sum taxation according to equations (12)-(13). It follows, that the
second-period optimal lump-sum tax per consumer is the solution T of
z
the equation
f~ 1{4 - N ~ - 0
i-1 Rk'tan-T Tz
z z
ltb(lta) - N ~ - 0 - (47)
(49)Because TZ and k'- (i-1,...,N) fit equatíon (49), T2 is sti1- the o~~-
timal lump-sum taxation per consumer after second-period capital stocks
k'~ have been realized, so that there is no dynsmic inconsistency.
what can the go~'ernment achieve with Fixed tax rates? Each consumer
reacts to fixed tax rates t and t according to equations (15)-(1~).
k n
The pair of tax rates (tk,tn) that maximizes social welfare (39), KLVE'[7
the technologic~l constraint (2) nnd the behaviourcil constrr~ints (]'il-
(17) for each consumer, and the government's budget constraint
g-ï" t Rk' tt an'
2 i- 1 k ë n 2 ' (50)
is given as the soluti.on to the set of two equations consisting of






- N n k - 0 (51)
(1-tk ) R` k~ t (1-tn ) an
Although it is very difficult to solve these equations analytically, it
is immediately clear that the command optimum will not result, simply
because different initial capital endowments will lead to different.
consumer behaviour according to equations (15)-(17). Furthermore, when
all capital endowments are the same, equation (51) reduces to equation
(18) with kr being the average capi!.al stock, and again, as was shown
earlier, the command optimum will not be achieved.
When the consumers tak~ into account that the taxes result in government
spending according to the budget constraint (50), a very different
problem arises because the consumers do not know each other's behaviour.
This problem can be dealt with by solving a Nash game between the con-
sumers under a fixed tas rate regime. It is easy to show that different
inítial cap.ital endowments again lead to different consumer behaviour,
so th~t this possible-. direction also diverges from the command optimum.But also wtien all consumers }lave the same initial capital endowments,
the command cptimum will not be achieved. When all other r~onsumers
behave according Lo (42)-(44), consumer i can get a higher ut.ility i~y
saving less th~ui in the commatid optimum, because he knows t.hat, given
the orher consumer's reactions, the decrease in government expenditures
g, :r~ too sma11 to compensate for the increase in his utility in the
first period. T'his is the well known 'free-rider' behaviour. When the
number of consumers goes to infinity, the relative influence of each
consumer on government spendings goes to zero and in the limit the open-
loop equilibrium results.
The optimal fixed tax rate policy determined by equations (51) and (19)
is time-inconsistent. This is not so easy to see as with one consumer,
because with N consumers t.ime-consistency does not necessarily iroply
t-0. The optimal first-period consumption leads to second-period n
capital stocks
t b(l;a)íl-tk)Rzki-(1-tn)an
k - {145(lra)}(1-tk)R (i-1,...,N) (52) z
In the second period each consumer reacts to fixed tax rates according
LV Ct~LLaL1Vn7 (GV)-(Li). 111C yniï V1 t,tlll L~t1tCS t11f11, ILGh1m1LeJ t1l~V -~ jel.Vl~d-
period part of social welfare (39), given the capital stocks k2 and the
appropriate techriological and behavioural constraints, is given by the
solution to the set of equations




1-1 (1-t )Rk't(1-t ) an (1-t )Rk f(1-t )an
k 2 n k 2 n
(53)
{ltstlat }{(1-tk)Rkzt(1-tn)ar} - (lta)(Rk2tan) - 0 (54)
Substir.ution of eq~~ation (52) in equaticn (54) leads to equation (19)
with k equal to the average initial capital endowment. Substitution of




- N (14a-r ){b(lia)(1-tk)R~ki-(1-tn)an} - 0
(lTa)(1-t ){11-t )R~lC 4(1-t )aIl}
n k 1 n
(55)
IJnder the sssumption made in section 2 that there are interior
solutions, equaticn (75) implíes that t 50. The open-loop tax rat.es
n
t and t are found ss the solution of equations (51) and (19). lf these
k n
tax rates also solve equation (55) the open-loop tax rate policy would
be time-consistent. Comparing equations (51) and (55) it follows that
(1-tk)(lta-tn)-(lfa)(1-t ). This implies that both tax rates have the
same sign. Because government spending must be positive, the open-loop
tax rate policy is time-inconsistent.
What can the government achieve wíth contingent tax rates? In principle
it is possible to distinguish between uniform tax rates and dif'ferent
tax rates per consumer. It will be clear t,hat the second possíbil.ity is
more powerftil and will generally give higher social welfare. In this
paper only the first possibility is investigated. The idea of strorig
time-consistency or subgame perfectness requires to Yirstiy solve the
equations (53) and (54) for the tax rates t and t, . These tax rates are
k n
then, together with the second-period behavioural equations (20)-(21)
per consumer, considered as functions of the second-period state of the
economy (k2,...,k~). The set of equations (53)-(54) is very difficult to
solve analytically unless all consumers have tYie same second-period
capital stock or k'-k for i.-1,....N, in that case the solution is z z








T'he marginal changes of Lhese contingent tax rates wi.th respect to
changes in the secor.d-period capital stocks k2 are-19-
t' ( k'
k 2
~t (k' . ,





ti (kl 'k~~ ) - n 2 - 0
(57) ., ~ ~k;
z
From equations (5II) and (59) it follows that, when the number of con-
sume~~s N goes to infinity, the marginal tax rates go to zero. This
implies that the subgame perfect equilibrium tends to the consistent
open-loop equilibrium when the number of (identical) consumers grows.
In case the consumers have different second-period capital stocks k' the
z
strongly consistent contingent tax rates are implicitly given by
equations (53) and (54). Implici.t differentiation of these equati-ons
yields a set of equations fbr the marginal tax rates t' and t'. In
k n
order not to complicate matters unnecessarily this set of equations is
not given here, although it is used for the numerical experiments to be
presented ir. ttie next section.
It remains to show how a contingent tax rate policy in general affects
the consumers. In order to be able to evaluate the effect of the first-
period consuyption decision on the tax rates each consumer has to form
expectations about the first period consumption of the other consumers.
A Nash game between the consumers is assumed here, which implies that
these expectations about each other's decisions are correct. The














(i-1,...,N) (60)where t, r. , t- and t- are functions cf the state (k~, ..,k;). It is
k r. k n . ~
interesting to note that Lhr: op,~n-loop Nash equilibrium between t!:c~
consumers, given a general contingent tati rate policy, is also cietrr-
mined by the set of equatiora (f)O)-(63). The strongly consistE:nt or
s~.~bgame perfect equilibrium for the taxation problem wit.h N consumer.s is
g1Cei: by equat.LOns (fi0)-(ó3), (53)-(54) and the set. of' equations for
Y.' ar.d t~ wt~icir results from implicit ditferentiation of' (53)-(5~a).
k n
Again the question arises whether there are contingent tax rate policies
that yield a better result in terms of utility than this subgame perfect
poli.cy. Again the answer is yes. However, for the problem with N con-
s~imers it is not generally possible to reach the command optimum. Tt:e
goverriment wants to maximize social welfare (39) over the set of contin-
gent tax rate policies, given the behavioural constraints (60)-(63) and
the government's budget constraint (50). The resulting social welfare
will be higher than in the subgame perfect equilibrium, because the
policies do not have to be implicitly given by equations (53)-(5f}).
Papavassilopoulos and Cruz (19~9) show a way how to solve this problem.
They transform the closed-loop problem into an open-loop problem with an
additional set of instruments consisting of the derivatives t` and t~.
k i
TZiis open-loop problem can be solved with standard techniques. A
solution to the closed-loop problem is given by tax rules that satisfy
the resultir,g optimal values for the tax rates and the derivatives. It
is very difficult, however, to find an analytical soluti-on. In case all
consumers have the same initial capital endowment k there are contin- i
gent Lax rate policies that yield the command optimum. Comparing t.he
behaviour of the consumers in the .~ommand optimum, given by equations
(42)-(44), and t;he behaviour of the consumers facing contingent tax rate
policies, given by equations (60)-63), it follows that these polícies
have to satisfv
t (k- .. ,k )R~t`(k~ .. ,k~)Rk-tt'(k~ . ,k-)an. - 0
1 2~ . k 2~ 2 2 n 2~ 2 2
(i-1,..,N) (64)
g
tklkz. . .k ) - ` (65)
NRk~-L ~ -
t (k~ . ,k~ ) - 0
n ~ ,
ln case the consumers have different initial capital endowments it is
not possible to achieve the command optimum. There is no contingent ta:~
rate pvlicy which induces the same decisions for each consumer as is
required in the command optimum.
The results show the same pattern as for the model with one consumer in
sections 2 and 3. Although the command optimum is only reached for the
model with N identical consumers, the closed-loop tax rate policy agairr
gives the highest social welfare. The open-loop tax rate policy is again
time-inconsistent. The feedback tax rate policy converges to the consis-
tent open-loop tax rate policy in the model with N identical consumers
when the number of consumers goes to infinity. For the model with dif-
ferent consumers this is probably also true, although this remains to be
proven. In the next section the properties of the tax rate policies
discussed in sections 2, 3 and 4 are illustrated by means of numerical
examples.5. NumNrical examplF~s
In the preceding sections the properties of a number of different, trrK
policies are discussed. In this section some numerical experiments are
presented to illustrate these properties.
ln all experiments the parameters of the utility function (1), the
marginal product:ivity of labour and capital and the maximum amount of
labour a consi~mer can supply are the same. 1'heir values are: a-0.25,
p-0.50, é-0.~0, a-1, b-0.50, which implies that R-1.50, and n-1.0. These
are the same values as Fischer (1980) uses.
In all tables below t.he following variables are presented. The utility
ti' in the equilibrium, the consumption in the first period c~ and in the
second period c~, the labour supply n` and the tax rates on labour and
capital income t and t, respectively. The value of government, spending
n k
g is not reporte3 but easily calculated as ~ï" c'. The capital stock
z i - 1 .
in the second period k' is also not reported but can be calculated as
Rk'-c`. r i
For the model with one consumer two different values for the init.ial
capitai endowment kt are distinguished: in table 1 k1-2.0 and in
rable Z k -0.ti0.
r
The command cpt.imum is the best possible outcome. This outcome will be
achieved when the consumer takes account of the government's budget
constrai-nt, with lump-sum taxation and with a closed-loop memory tax
rate policy. The open-loop tax rate policy gives a better result than
the consister.t open-loop policy. As was proven in the appendix, the same
applíes f'or the feedback policy. In the example of table 2 the consis-
tent apen-loop policy does not exist. For the feedback policy and t.he
open-loop policy the welfare ranking is ambiguous. In the example of
table 1 the feedback policy gives the higher social welfare, whereas in
the example of table 2 the open-loop policy is better.
In taóles 3 and 4 there are two consumers. Table 3 gives the results
when both consumers have the same initial capital endowment.s ki-ki-2.0.
In table 4 the endowments differ: k1-1.~0 and k2-2.30. The command
t t
optimum is the same in bor.h examples, because it only depends on the
average initial endowment. 'with identical endowments both the closed-
loop memory tax rate policy and the uniform lump-sum taxation poiicy-23-
lead to the command optimum. With different endowments the command
optimum does not result. The closed-loop tax rate policy is always
better then the open-loop and the feedback policies, which in turn are
better than the consístent open-loop policy (if it exists). The ranking
of the feedback ~u~d the open-loop polic.ies is ambiguous again. When tli?
c~nsumers take account of t!ie government's budget constraint the result.
is always better than when they do not. The command optimum will not, `~e
achieved, however, even when both consumers have t.he same endowments.
Table 1: One consumer. k-2.0
]
U c c n t t
] 2 2 n k
command optimum 0.759 1.424 1.922 0.519 -.- -.-
open-loop 0.706 1.726 1.553 0.419 0.332 0.334
feedback 0.724 1.725 1.664 0.584 0.000 0.435
consistent open-loop 0.625 2.014 1.417 0.646 0.000 0.479
Table 2: One consumer, k-0.5
]
U c c n t t
] 2 2 n k
command optimum -1.690 0.550 0.743 0.814 -.- -.-
open-loop -1.719 0.587 0.653 0.734 0.386 0.176
feedback -1.725 0.667 0.643 0.839 0.000 2.571
consist;ent open-loop does not exist for these parameter valuesTable 3: Two consumers, k1-2.0, k`-2.0
i i
command optimum 1 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 -.- -.- -.-
2 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 -.- -.- -.-
tor.. 2.t42 2.8!{8 3.845 1.039 -.- -.- -.-
closed-loop 1 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 0.000 0.407 -.-
2 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 0.000 0.407 -.-
tot. 2.142 2.848 3.8!~5 1.039 -.- --- -.-
uniform lump-sum 1 1.C71 1.424 1.922 0.519 -.- -.- 0.9h1
taxation 2 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 -.- -.- o.9F~1
tot. 2.142 2.848 3.845 1.039 -.- -.- 1.~~:'2
open-loop with 1 1.060 1.561 1.755 0.474 0.331 0.334 -.-
budget restriction 2 1.060 1.561 1.755 0.474 0.331 0.334 -.-
tot. 2.120 3.122 3.511 0.948 -.- -.- -.-
open-loop 1 1.018 1.726 1.553 0.419 0.332 0.334 -.
2 1.018 1.726 1.553 0.419 0.332 0.334 -.
tot. 2.036 3.453 3.106 0.838 -.- -.- -.
feedback 1 1.005 1.837 1.568 0.608 0.000 0.449 -.-
2 1.005 1.837 1.568 0.608 0.000 0.449 -.-
tot. 2.010 3.674 3.137 1.216 -.- -.- -.-
consistent 1 0.937 2.014 1.417 0.646 0.000 0.479 -.-
open-loop 2 0.937 2.014 1.417 0.646 0.000 0.479 -.-
tot. 1.874 4.027 2.834 1.292 -.- -.- -.-Table 4: Twc coasumers, k~-1.70, k'-2.30
i
i L` c` c~
i 1
command opti.mum 1 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 -
2 1.071 1.424 1.922 0.519 -
r.ot. 2.142 2.848 3.8115 1.039 -
closed-loop 1 0.848 1.321 1.700 0.601 -0.065 0.425 -.-
2 ~.271 1.524 2.181 0.488 -0.065 0.425 -.-
tot. 2.118 2.8~14 3.882 1.089 -.- -.- -.-
uniform lump-sum 1 0.730 1.218 1.644 0.589 -.- -.- 0.~344
taxation 2 1.364 1.641 2.216 0.446 -.- -.- 0.944
tot. 2.094 2.859 3.518 1.035 -.- -.- 1.887
open-loop with 1 0.794 1.411 1.525 0.557 0.247 0.353 -.
budget restriction 2 1.263 1.741 1.992 0.442 0.247 0.353 -.
tot. 2.090 3.t52 3.5i8 0.999 -.- -.- -.
-1~ 1 0~~l1 1~~n i~~~ n lin~ n~~~ n~~~ -
vp.`~ ..n vvY I . l`-`~ ' J`~J '' J 1 . J`-J ~ JJ"
2 1.263 i.943 1.743 0.357 0.323 0.336 -
tot. 2.004 3.463 3.106 0.854 -.- -.- -.-
feedback 1 0.801 1.676 1.426 0.679 -0.109 0.487 -.-
2 i.214 1.898 1.843 0.585 -0.109 0.!~87 -.-
tot. 2.015 3-574 3.268 1.263 -.- -.- -.
consistent
open-loop does not exist for these parameter values6. Conclusions
This paper considers a simple dynamic taxation problem where t're
government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. It is shc!wn
that in the case of one (representati~,~e) consumer there exist conting~nt
tax r-!tE. policies which lead to t.he command opt;mum. However, these
cont-ngent tax rate policies are not. cre~3ible in the sense tha;. thc~y arc
not t.ime consistent off the equi.libríum path. A rational consumer wi11
not believe these policies in case the government does not have to n!ake
commitments and mistakes or unexpected events are not excluded. A re-
quirement of credibility or strong time-consistency or subgame
perfectness leads to a social welfare result which is lower than rhe
command optimum but higher than the time-consistent outcome derived by
rischer (19fi0). This is possible because here the government can emr~lo,y
information on the state of the economy at the time of the ar,tual
decisions. Depending on the parameters of the model this subgame perfect
outcome can either be better or worse than the time-inconsistent result
dericed by Fischer ( 1980). In the case of more than one consumer
generally the same welfare ranking results. With a growing number of
consumers the social welfare gain of the subgame perfect equilibrium
over the t.i.me-consistent equilibrium tends to di-sappear. The command
optimum is only achieved with a contingent tax rate policy when the
consumers have the same initial capital endowments.
This paper does not consider the possibility that the government can
employ a different. tax rate for each consumer. It is clear that in this
way the command optimum can be reached. A precise treatment of this
pr7ssibility i s subject of further research.
The model used in this paper is very simple. What happens with other,
more generaï utility functions or technologies? What is the effect of
the int.roduction of expenditure taxes or distributive goals? How does an
extension of' the time horizon with labour supply and government spending
in all pericds affect the results in this paper? What are the effects of
embedding these contingent tax rate policies in an intergenerational
model? A].1 these questions are left for further research.-1-
Appendix
This appendix proves for the model with one consumer that the feedback
equilibrium is better than the consistent open-loop equilibrium. As in
section 2 it is assumed that eill maxi.mization problems have interior
solut i o:,s .






n - n - -
~ a
which results in utility
U(c ) - lnc tó(ltatg)ln(R`k tan-Rcl)tU~
(a.~'}
(a.3)
wirei~e u is coriaiairL.
o ,
The optimal U is reached for the command optimum value c~ given by
~ i
equation (4). To the right of c. the Function U is strictly cjecreasing. r
The feedback equilibrium value cF~ is given by equation (27). The values
r
oF the other decision variables are given by equations (25), (26), (22),
(23) and the government's budget constraint. Equation (25) and the
technological constraint (2) yield equation (a.l). Equations (22), (23),
(25) and the government's budget constraint yield equation (a.3). It
follows that equations (a.l)-(a.3) are satisfied, so that the utility in
the feedback equilibrium is given by U(cFD).
i
The consistent open-loop equilibrium value c~~o`~is given by equation t
(15), where t~-0 according to equation (23) and tk has to satisfy the
quadratic equation (24). The values of the other decision variables in
this equilibrium are given by equations (16), (17), (23), (24) and the
go~~ernment's budget constraint. Equations (15), (16), (22), (23) and the
technological constraint (2) yield equation (a.l). Equations (17) arid-1]-
;~3) ~ield equaticn (a.2~. Equations '). (~j). (a.l), thc tech-
nologícal constrainC (2) and the government's budget constraint, vic:i,i
equarion (a.3). It follows that eyuations (a.l)-(a.3) are satisfied, :-o
that the utility in the consistent open-loop equili.brium is givc~n hy
cu~ li(c ).
, , ~ ,„ ~a
Eecause ~~0 ~-t foll,~w5 that c(~ , so that U(c )~U(c ), which is r.ut
, , t ,
surprísing since the command optimum gives the highest utility. More
interesting is, that if t)0 it follows that ct~(c~~c so tF~at
, , k 1 1
U(cr~))U(c~o~). This implies that, if there exists a consistent open- i i
loop equilibrium, thi.s equilibrium is worse tha~i the feedbacic
equilibrium. Existence of a consistent open-loop equilibrium is namely
based on the existence of real roots to the quadratic equation (24), and
if these real roots exist they are positive.
This .ynalysis also shows clearly that the smallest of the two real root.;
of eyuation (24), if they exist, gives the highest utility and thus
leads to the consistent open-loop equilibrium.
Finaliy it should be not.ed that the open-loop equilibrium can not be
compared with the other equilibria in this way, because equati.or,s (a.l)-
(a.3) are not satisfied in this equilibrium.References
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